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I 
Discussions of Brecht's work customarily point to the formidable 
influence exerted by his aesthetic theory and theatrical practice on 
modern cultural landscapes. One scholar notes that "even dramatists 
with totally different political standpoints are forced to define their 
aims in his terms. As an instant classic' he stands like a rock in the 
mainstream of German drama, forming stylistic eddies even in work 
that has no connection with his 'theatre of the scientific age'."1 
While it is clear that Brecht's vision of an epic theatre has 
inspired much work done in theatres on the Continent, in Britain, 
North America and elsewhere, it must be noted that the ensuing 
widespread attention to Brecht's theoretical and practical work seldom 
has been accompanied by any account of the principles and assump-
tions which form the complex theoretical apparatus of Brecht's 
aesthetic. Specifically, discussions of the conceptual armature of 
Brecht's aesthetic often fall into the trap of accepting and absorbing 
his own characterizations of the key terms in which he couches his 
discourse. For instance, writing of the Brechtian concept of 
Verfremdungseffekt, Eugene Lunn points out that "it is intellectually 
designed to reveal a knowable, but shifting, multifaceted and con-
tradictory outer reality, estranging his audiences from habituated 
mental assumptions so that they may be able to truly master the 
social world. What is left unexamined in such descriptions of the 
Brechtian project are Brecht's own key assumptions based on specific 
philosophical frames of reference. In short, discussions of Brecht's 
aesthetic usually accept, without further analysis, its implicit 'realist' 
epistemological framework based on two undeveloped assumptions: (i) 
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there is an objective world independent of the perceiver, and (ii) 
theatre, if properly grasped as a site in which Verfremdung is 
operative, can offer 'correct' (truthful) representations of that world. 
In unpacking the fundamental philosophical assumptions which 
support Brecht's aesthetic, the present essay attempts to place the 
theory of Verfremdung in its proper textual site. While Brecht's 
theory of knowledge is developed in scattered texts such as the Short 
Organum and in brief, theory-laden fragments, such epistemological 
assumptions are basic to the whole edifice of his aesthetic theory. 
In questioning the inherent epistemological framework of Brecht's 
theory, we aim to show that it is problematic to claim that Verfrem-
dung is a way of bridging the gap between an external world and the 
dramatic text. What is thereby eshewed is Brecht's adherence to the 
highly problematic principle that there can be correct representations 
of the world, representations whose truth is secured and legitimized 
by a metanarrative derived from Marxist philosophy. In suspending 
the principle of correctness what is gained is a better sense of the 
dynamics at work in the Brechtian texts. Indeed, what such reading 
enhances is the very fictionality of Brecht's dramatic texts which 
offer liberating perspectives on his (and our) epoch. 
II 
A reading of Brecht's philosophical writings, including the notes 
and fragments that comprise his "Marxistische Studien," reveals a 
thinker who is critical of various types of idealism. In a fragment 
critical of those who "hammer out (idealistic) world-views," Brecht 
writes: "Do not create a picture of the world for its own sake." 
Brecht's relationship to philosophical idealisms is worthy of further 
exploration, but it can be maintained that the Brechtian notion of 
Verfremdung is related to Hegel's notion of Entfremdung, as sketched 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit in connection with the process of 
knowledge-formation. Although Brecht never directly acknowledged 
this relationship, the two notions stand in an inverse relation to one 
another, a relationship Brecht might have termed dialectical. 
Hegel employed his concept of Entfremdung to describe the 
process whereby an observer derives knowledge about the world by 
perceiving it as if it were "strange." Brecht's concept, by contrast, is 
an aesthetic device whereby the world depicted or represented on 
stage is made to appear strange so that observers (the audience) may 
derive knowledge about it. 
A sense of the highly problematic issues involved in the notion 
of Verfremdung can be gathered from paragraph 44 of A Short Or-
ganum for the Theatre, Brecht's most developed theoretical statement, 
in which there are hints that Brecht knew of the inversion mentioned 
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above. Addressing what is required of a perceiver to move beyond a 
merely passive acceptance of the world in which he or she lives, 
Brecht writes: 
To make all the givens appear to him as doubtful he would 
first have to develop that estranged (verfremdet) way of 
looking with which the great Galileo observed a swinging 
chandelier. He was astonished by the swinging motion, as if 
he had not expected it and could not understand why it 
occurred, and through this he arrived at its principles. This 
way of looking, as difficult as it is productive, the theatre 
must provoke through its depictions of human social 
existence. It must make its audience wonder and this 
happens through its depictions of human social existence. It 
must make its audience wonder and this happens through 
the technique of making the familiar strange. 
(GW, Vol 16, pp. 681-682) 
Brecht argues that theatre is to be created in which the world 
observed on stage will be presented in such a way as to incite the 
audience into the way of seeing which Hegel termed Entfremdung. In 
other words, Verfremdung is a theatrical and textual device which 
aims to provoke Entfremdung. Taking this statement to the extreme 
one might say that the result Brecht wishes to effect in the relation-
ship between the stage and the audience is similar to a situation in 
which Galileo's chandelier would not only swing, but also give him 
the clues as to why it did so. What Brecht has overlooked is that the 
process Galileo underwent was a mental process. It is not the case 
that Galileo observed a strange, abnormal or verfremdet event. 
Rather, it is the observation of a normal event which Galileo 
entfremdet by breaking it into its component parts in the act of 
scientific analysis. This is not to suggest that Verfremdung does not 
exist, merely that Brecht's presentation of it is flawed, such that it 
can function on his terms only if one accepts the untenable position 
that it is possible to force an audience to analyze what it is watching 
and to think in a manner of Entfremdung. 
We do not claim that Brecht aimed at creating representational 
depictions of the world on stage. It is well known that Brecht con-
ceived of a theatre which would inspire an audience to alter its 
perception of reality. Theatre would assist in dispelling the false 
consciousness of audience members, a task legitimized by Marxist 
theory and achieved through socialist practical action. It could be 
said that what Brecht aimed at was to force the audience into a 
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perceptual state of Entfremdung, that he was as much interested in 
changing how we see as in what is seen. Indeed, such an objection to 
what has been outlined thus far would have its merits only it Brecht's 
project were to be taken at face value. What is questioned here are 
the crucial philosophical contradictions which underlie his notion of 
Verfremdung. As Brecht noted: "Epistemology must first and foremost 
be critique of language." (GW, Vol. 20, p. 140) 
The development of the theoretical foundation of Verfremdung 
became important to Brecht as part of his rejection of Gorki's 
definition of Socialist Realism and Georg Lukâcs' attacks on expres-
sionist experimentation in defense of Realism based on the notion of 
"typicality." It was especially in the confrontation with Lukâcs, 
chronicled in the journal Dos Wort, that Brecht defended formal 
experimentation against the aesthetic formalism which he observed 
among socialist theoreticians. Verfremdung was thus to be given a 
political dimension which could be justified within a Marxist discourse 
as well as an aesthetic dimension which would achieve this political 
purpose. In the Short Organum Brecht emphasized the changeability 
of the world and the particular enjoyment which the "children of the 
scientific age" derive in securing the possibilities for change depicted 
on stage. Brecht insists that Verfremdung will provoke critical as-
sessments of reality on the part of the audience. His basic assumption 
is that the intent of the presentation will be effected in the minds of 
audience members. Of course, whether this is so or not cannot be 
tested in an actual setting, but, as we argue, these claims are founded 
on questionable premises. The objection that Brecht's theatre is a 
presentational theatre and not one that is representational is, from an 
aesthetic standpoint, true, but his theory is nonetheless based on a 
philosophical model of representation. 
Verfremdung as a notion is tenable only if, in the first instance, 
a commitment has been made to the premise which assumes that it is 
possible to produce intellectually a correct description of the world. 
The premise holds if it is, in fact, possible to arrive at a translucent 
sign which truly represents the world. Once false consciousness has 
been dispelled, the audience will be able to view the world in its 
historicity and mutability. As attractive as such a notion is, it over-
looks Brecht's own admonition concerning the critique of language. It 
is precisely Brecht's use of the vocabulary of dialectical materialism 
which forces him into a representationalist corner. With a conceptual 
apparatus that includes such highly contentious notions as "base and 
superstructure" and the claim that social being determines intellectual 
being, dialectical materialism betrays an acceptance of the notion that 
something exists separately from the human expression of it, i.e. that 
the human mind fundamentally reflects its environment rather than 
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participating actively in its creation. There is, to be sure, an ap-
preciation of the dialectical interrelationship between mind and en-
vironment in the frame of reference in which the Brechtian discourse 
is located, but the vocabulary of dialectical materialism clearly 
privileges the material environment, specifically the economic and 
social nexus. The reflectionism inherent in this interpretative scheme 
has consequences for Brecht's theory, inasmuch as he privileges the 
world which, for him, lies before the sign. In this sense, then, it can 
be shown that underlying Brecht's presentationalist proposal for the 
theatre is a problematic representationalist view of the world. It is 
precisely due to this schism that Brecht engaged in fierce polemics 
with thinkers such as Lukâcs. 
With dialectical materialism Brecht shares a faith in the trans-
parent reciprocity between the world and the sign. A sense of the 
reflectionism inherent in Marxist epistemology can be gathered from 
Brecht's declarations on dialectical thinking: 
The dialectic is . . . something which Nature possesses (and 
always has), a property which was first discovered by Hegel 
and Marx. 
Only in the mind of the dialectician is this thing, the 
dialectic, which is a property of Nature, reflected. 
(GW, Vol. 20, pp. 151-152) 
On these terms, it is said to be possible that a sign is mentally pro-
duced which "mirrors" Nature. Such a separation between sign and 
what it is supposed to reflect or mirror betrays a traditional and 
highly suspect interpretation of sign, language, and aesthetics. An 
alternative (postmodern) expression, by contrast, asserts that the sign 
stands for itself, that it is not a reflection of something external. It 
is more appropriate to speak of a sign's participation in the making of 
a world than of its supposed reflection of an outer world. If the 
latter were the case, the sign would be a mere tabula rasa, passively 
registering what the exterior imprints upon some intérieur. Worlds 
exist, then, because humans create them in various forms of sign-
making activities, the making of theatre among them. On this count, 
therefore, the problem with dialectical materialism and with the repre-
sentational assumptions which subtend Brecht's presentational aes-
thetic, is that they assume a number of problematic notions, namely 
that the world exists before interpretation; that a sign is separable 
from its context; that something lies before the making of meaning; 
that there are ultimate material truths which the mind can grasp. 
74
 : Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
This truth can be secured, following these claims, if we learn 
Entfremdung, that, if we learn to see with the clarity of materialist 
dialectics, freed from the cloudiness of false consciousness. 
In light of the foregoing it should be noted that Galilio's 
entfremdet observation of the chandelier did not merely result in a 
better reflection of the world, in a more "accurate" picture of it. It 
resulted in a different world, one which was incompatible with the 
previous scientifically-understood world. The consequence of Galileo's 
way of seeing was a profoundly different world, though it was a world 
not necessarily better in accordance with the myth that human know-
ledge advances ever-closer to the ultimate truth. Although this clear-
ly belongs to another discussion, suffice it to say here that the 
teleological, deterministic dream of humankind's progress towards truth 
and liberation through science is shared by the Marxist assumption 
that the progressive unveiling of ultimate material truth will both 
reflect and spur on the inevitable victory of a collective historical 
subject. Our argument, then, is that as signs create worlds, they are 
capable of making differences and changes in human thinking and 
action. This, however, is a different assertion than the claim that it 
is possible, through theatre or in other world-making acts, to unveil 
the "real forces" which govern history. Through Verfremdung Brecht 
attempted to unravel the real workings of the social world so as to 
produce a presentation which would hint at the contradictions con-
stitutive of reality. Not truth, but political intent and philosophical 
contradiction were revealed. Brecht's intention to construct an 
aesthetic which would reveal truth, thus, cannot really be said to have 
failed, since, in the postmodern outlook it is impossible to do so to 
begin with. The erection of a presentational theatre on the shaky 
foundation of a representational epistemology vitiated such a task. 
As noted earlier, this should not be taken as a rejection of the 
possible functioning of Verfremdung within an art work. The notions 
of aesthetic distancing, estrangement and Verfremdung: had been put to 
use even before Brecht offered his own version. Such Russian 
thinkers as Osip Brik and Roman Jakobson had advanced their theories 
of art both before and after the 1917 Revolution. Central to Russian 
Formalist thought was the notion that literary art works differentially 
in relation to its environment in that literature estranges it. Similar 
understandings have been voiced by a host of other thinkers, from 
Edward Gullough's famous article on "Psychical Distance as a Factor in 
Art and an Aesthetic Principle"" to Ortega y Gasset's The Dehuman-
ization of Art, in which we find: 
. . . . a work of art vanishes from sight for a beholder who 
seeks in it nothing but the moving fate of John and Mary 
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or Tristan and Isolde and adjusts his vision to this. 
Tristan's sorrows are sorrows and can evoke compassion 
only in so far as they are taken as real. But an object of 
art is artistic only in so far as it is not real. In order to 
enjoy Titian's portrait of Charles the Fifth on horseback, 
we must forget that this is Charles the Fifth in Person and 
see instead a portrait-that is, an image, a fiction. The 
portrayed person and his portrait are two entirely different 
things, we are interested in either the one or the other. In 
the first case we "live" with Charles the Fifth, in the 
second we look at an object of art. 
It is, in fact, this aspect of art which enables humans to exercise 
options and explore new possibilities within fictional settings. Brecht 
recognized this when he noted: 
Based on the things with which he comes into contact and 
with which he must get along, the human makes pictures, 
little models which reveal to him how they function. He 
also makes depictions of humans. Based on their behaviour 
in certain situations, which he has observed, he draws con-
clusions about their behaviour in other, future situations. 
(GW, Vol. 20, pp. 168-169) 
With his theory of Verfremdung, Brecht put to use and 
emphasized an intrinsic property of art for the purpose of exercising 
artistic options within a worldview established by dialectical material-
ism. It must be reiterated, however, that this does not compel an 
audience to observe the world with entfremdet eyes. 
Having thus examined certain inconsistencies in the logic of 
Brecht's aesthetic, we examine more closely the consequences of 
having suspended the problematic representationlism of Brecht's notion 
of Verfremdung. 
Ill 
Brecht's theory of Verfremdung is indebted to the epistemological 
frames of references inherited from German Idealism and Marxism. As 
such, Brecht's own theory bristles with tensions and hesitations 
characteristic of dialectical materialism. A brief sketch of the dialec-
tic of subject and object, central to paradigms of dialectical 
provenance, will set into focus its correlate in Brecht's view concern-
ing the relationship between text and world. 
Whereas the Hegelian dialectic is propelled towards the telos of 
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"absolute truth" by the ever-widening rationality of a mind that comes 
to know itself, the Marxist dialectic advances through the material 
praxis (the labour) of a collective human subject acting upon its 
world. One pole of the Marxist dialectic of subject and object claims 
that humans create their own history, a notion which reflects the 
activity-centered concerns of Hegelian anthropology. The objective 
pole of the Marxist dialectic, by contrast, claims that it is only under 
given conditions that humans create their history. Human activity is 
tempered or "determined" by the social context in which that activity 
arises. The objective pole of the Marxist dialectical frame of 
reference thus permits the articulation of a deterministic view, namely, 
that it is the social which determines human consciousness. The 
wavering of Marxist dialectics between (i) an activistic and interven-
tionist theory of an expressive human subject and (ii) a deterministic 
theory of consciousness poses serious problems for an aesthetic based 
on a subject-object dialectic and for a theory of Verfremdung which is 
placed in the context of epistemological problems dealing with percep-
tion and representations of the world. Debates within Marxist thought 
have reflected a hesitation as to which of the two poles is to be 
considered predominant. An accentuation of the subjective, activistic 
pole results in a Marxism with Existentialist or voluntaristic hues, 
whereas theories claiming dominance of the objective pole include 
Leninist copy-theories of knowledge (Widerspiegelungstheorien). 
Without engaging in the debate concerning predominance of terms 
within a dialectical framework, suffice it to say that the Marxist 
model admits of some kind of reciprocity between human subject and 
world. An interactionist subject-object epistemology is basic to Marx-
ist philosophy and to its teleological view of history which understands 
"correct" or genuine knowledge as that which fosters human develop-
ment towards a socialist telos. Implicit in Brecht's theory is the 
dialectical framework with its concept of knowledge as world-trans-
formation. 
A correlate of the subject-object dialectic is a view which may 
be termed the dialectic of text and world. On such a view, a text 
(and, by extension, a dramatic presentation of a theatre-text) offers 
correct Abbildungen (Brecht's term) or representations of the "laws" 
governing human social existence. According to the Brechtian theory, 
theatre, one moment within the first term of this dialectic, can give 
correct depictions of the hidden mechanisms and explicit contradictions 
of life in a social world scarred by exploitation and oppression. Yet, 
such a representation of the world is not for Brecht merely a copy of 
reality. The representation itself offers "correct" images (the correct-
ness secured through the Marxist meta-narrative), though the images 
displace the customary views of social reality, turning them upside-
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down, inverted and estranged. 
The text-world dialectic subtending Brecht's aesthetic claims 
correctness as a hallmark of theatre's depictions of reality. Our 
contention is that such a claim is not needed, indeed, that such a 
claim to objectivity (i.e. descriptions of "objective" laws of social 
existence) detracts from the very fictionality which stirs humans into 
action in their world. Whereas Brecht argues that Verfremdung 
arouses the mind of the spectator at the theatre event to critical 
reflection and then intervention upon his or her world (a view which, 
in turn, is a correlate of the unity of theory and praxis propounded 
by Marxism), we note that Verfremdung is a textual device and not 
some bridge between an exterior (the "outer" world) and interior (text 
or enactment of text). Reflection on the notion that there is a text-
world dialectic is inevitably drawn to the metaphorically charged 
images that must be employed in making sense of that dialectical 
relationship. Indeed, the spatial images inherent in the dialectic of 
text and world (a dialectic of inner and outer) points to the degree to 
which perceptions and representations are fictional and perspectival. 
Brecht's claim that correctness is a criterion (secured by Marxist 
philosophy) by which theatre's images of the world are to be judged is 
thus held in abeyance. The claim to truth is tempered, but in its 
place the play of textuality comes to the fore. Brecht's greatness, to 
follow Roland Barthes' characterization, is that "he keeps inventing 
Marxism. Brecht reclaims from Marxism not only its problematic 
epistemology, but-perhaps more productively-a narrative framework 
within which the drama of human life in dark times can be told. 
Marxism, on the one hand, provides Brecht with a problem-laden 
theoretical underpinning for his aesthetic, but it also secures a 
fictional frame of reference within which artistic options can be 
exercized and new aesthetic horizons explored. Given the tensions 
within the Marxist paradigm, however, it is not the case that the real 
is directly or correctly known. Instead, the real is known-to follow 
Barthes' echoing of Nietzsche-only "in the form of effects (physical 
world), functions (social world), or fantasies (cultural world); in short; 
the real is never anything but an inference; when we declare that we 
are copying reality, this means that we choose a certain inference and 
not certain others."^ 
On these terms, then, the real becomes textualized. The world 
emerges as a text which is to be deciphered by the meta-language of 
Brechtian aesthetic theory and by the performance of theatre texts. 
It is quite possible that Brecht knew of this tendency, though he 
could not fully explicate its implications, given his commitment to 
Marxist dialectics. Yet, paragraph 27 of the Short Organum notes that 
theatre, "with such slight and pitiful things as a bit of cardboard, a 
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little miming, and pieces of text," can move its audience with "so 
feeble a reflection of the world." (GW, Vol 16, p. 674) 
We may conclude with Barthes that Brechtian theatre posits a 
"Marxist meaning" even as it transcends such a frame of reference in 
Brecht's suspension of meaning", i.e. in the claim that it is the spec-
tator or reader who is to participate in the act of making worlds out 
of theatre's fictional signs. The tension within politically engaged 
literature is such that the meaning of its significations is simulta-
neously frozen within the signifier even as it is set free, unleashed in 
the textual play of signification. Brecht's solicitation of a Marxist 
science of meaning with its criteria of truth and correctness is thus 
counterbalanced by Brecht's contributions to a Utopian permanent 
revolution of signification in which meaning, now deferred, opens new 
horizons not only for aesthetic theory and political practice, but also 
for dramatic narration. Brecht is the Marxist fabulist whose texts, 
once deconstructed, reveal themselves to be the very thing they were 
all along, now shorn, however, of their problematic underpinnings. 
Brecht's texts emerge as powerful fictions which-as is the case with 
Utopian perspectives that project new worlds-show the shimmerings of 
a humane not-yet in the alienating and deadening realm of what has 
thus far been the slaughterhouse of history. 
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